Game Theory

Recommended Course Outline 


This is a course outline that I recommend for my game theory classes. It is an ordered list of topics and lecture videos that should be watched in a proper sequence for effective learning. Each video builds upon the concepts introduced in the previous ones, so it's important to watch them in order. All lecture videos on my channel are in the list below.


Feel free to skip some videos based on your interests and objectives. However, please keep in mind the order of the videos. To make the navigation of my channel more user-friendly, I have categorized each video in this list as "Beginner," "Intermediate," and "Advanced."


If you have little to no college background, such as being a high school student, or if you finished college some years ago and would like to gain some intuition, then watching videos labeled as "Beginner" will most likely meet your needs. However, if you want a more in-depth understanding of game theory concepts, such as being a second-year college student, then you should watch videos that are labeled as both "Beginner" and "Intermediate." Lastly, if you want a challenge or are a third/fourth-year college student, you should watch all the videos on the list, including the ones labeled "Advanced."


If you're pursuing a master's or Ph.D. degree, the videos on this list could serve as excellent resources for refreshing your knowledge or catching up with the rest of the class. Typically, graduate-level game theory courses cover more detailed and advanced topics and examples. Please check out the outline under the Advanced Game Theory course for more advanced treatment of game theory.


Course Description and Objective

 

This is an undergraduate-level course that provides an introduction to game theory and strategic thinking. It focuses on the theory of non-cooperative games with an emphasis on its economic applications. Game theory deals with decision-making problems that involve multiple people, where each person's action affects the payoffs of others. In such situations, making the best decision may require strategic thinking; one must consider how their actions will affect the incentives of other players and whether those players are aware of these interconnections.


To succeed in this course, it is crucial to have strong analytical and logical thinking skills and the ability to draw conclusions based on qualitative information. While a working knowledge of calculus (such as functions of one or several variables, derivatives), probability (such as random variables, probability distributions, conditional probabilities, expectations), and optimization is required, we will review these concepts to some extent in the first week.


At the end of the course, students should be able to 


Suggested Textbooks



Course Outline



TOPIC 1: MATHEMATICS AND LOGIC REVIEWS (Intermediate-Advanced)


       1. Part 1 (Intermediate)

       2. Part 2 (Intermediate)

       3. Part 3 (Intermediate)

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       1. Section 1 (Intermediate)

       2. Section 2 (Intermediate)

       3. Section 2 - Example 2 (Intermediate)

       4. Section 2 - Example 3 (Intermediate)

       5. Section 2 - Example 4 (Intermediate)

       6. Section 2 - Example 5 (Intermediate)

       7. Section 3 (Intermediate)

       8. Section 3 - Example 2 (Intermediate)

       9. Section 3 - Example 3 (Intermediate)

       10. Section 4 (Intermediate)

       11. Section 4 - Example 2 (Intermediate)

       12. Section 5 (Intermediate)

       13. Section 5 - Example 2 (Intermediate)

       14. Section 5 Theorems (Intermediate)

       15. Section 5 Theorems - Example 2 (Intermediate)

       16. Section 6 (Intermediate)

       17. Section 6 - Example 2 (Intermediate)

       18. Section 7 (Intermediate)

       19. Section 7 - Example 2 (Intermediate)

       20. Section 7 - Example 3 (Intermediate)

       21. Section 7 - Example 4 (Intermediate)

       22. Section 8 (Intermediate)

       23. Section 8 - Example 2 (Intermediate)

       24. Section 8 - Example 3 (Intermediate)

       25. Review Questions - Part 1 (Intermediate)

       26. Review Questions - Part 2 (Advanced)

       27. Review Questions - Part 3 (Advanced)

       28. Review Questions - Part 4 (Advanced)

       29. Review Questions - Part 5 (Advanced)

       30. Review Questions - Part 6 (Advanced)

       31. Review Questions - Part 7 (Advanced)

      ​

       1. Part 1 (Intermediate)

       2. Part 2 (Intermediate)

       3. Part 3 (Intermediate)

 

       1. Probability (Intermediate)

 

        1. Part 1 (Intermediate-Advanced)

        2. Part 2 (Intermediate-Advanced)

        3. Part 3 (Intermediate-Advanced)

        4. Part 4 (Intermediate-Advanced)

 

       1. Part 1 (Intermediate-Advanced)

       2. Part 2 (Intermediate-Advanced)

       3. A short review (Intermediate-Advanced)

       4. An example (Intermediate-Advanced)

       5. Another example (Intermediate-Advanced)



TOPIC 2: INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY (GAME THEORY PLAYLIST 1) (Beginner-Intermediate)


       1. Introduction to Game Theory - Part 1 (Beginner)

       2. Introduction to Game Theory - Part 2 (Beginner)

       3. Introduction to Game Theory - Part 3 (Beginner)

       4. Strategy in Games (Beginner)

       5. Normal (Strategic) Form Representation of Games - Part 1 (Beginner)

       6. Normal (Strategic) Form Representation of Games - Part 2 (Beginner)

       7. Review Examples for Normal Form Representation - Example 1 (Beginner)

       8. Review Examples for Normal Form Representation - Example 2 (Beginner)

       9. Review Examples for Normal Form Representation - Example 3 (Beginner)

       10. Beliefs & Mixed Strategies - Part 1 (Beginner-Intermediate)

       11. Beliefs & Mixed Strategies - Part 2 (Beginner-Intermediate)

       12. General Assumptions and Methodology (Beginner)

       13. Efficiency in Games (Intermediate)



TOPIC 3: BASIC SOLUTION CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS: STRATEGIC DOMINANCE, BEST RESPONSE, AND RATIONALIZABILITY (GAME THEORY PLAYLIST 2) (Beginner-Intermediate)


       1. Strategic Dominance (Beginner-Intermediate)

       2. Best Response (Beginner-Intermediate)

       3. Dominance versus Best response (Beginner-Intermediate)

       4. A Review Example for Best Response and Strict Domination (Beginner-Intermediate)

       5. A Review Example for Best Response and Strict Domination - Part 1 (Intermediate)

       6. A Review Example for Best Response and Strict Domination - Part 2 (Intermediate)

       7. Weak Dominance (Beginner-Intermediate)

       8. Rationalizability & Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies (IESDS) (Beginner)

       9. An application for Rationalizability and IESDS: Location Game (Beginner)

       10. An Application for Rationalizability and IESDS: Partnership Game (Beginner-Intermediate)

       11. A Review Example for Rationalizability and IESDS (Intermediate)

       12. A Review Example for Rationalizability and IESDS (Intermediate)



TOPIC 4: NASH EQUILIBRIUM (GAME THEORY PLAYLIST 3) (Beginner-Intermediate)


       1. Nash Equilibrium: Why We Need? (Beginner)

       2. Nash Equilibrium: Formal Definition and Intuition (Beginner)

       3. Finding Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Finite Simultaneous-Move Games (Beginner)

       4. Finding Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Cournot Duopoly Game (Intermediate)

       5. Finding Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Bertrand Duopoly Game (Beginner)

       6. Finding Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium: Median Voting Theorem (Beginner)

       7. Danger in Finding Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium: A Critical Example (Intermediate)



TOPIC 5: MIXED STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIUM (GAME THEORY PLAYLIST 4) (Intermediate)


       1. Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium (Intermediate)

       2. Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium: Further Remarks (Intermediate)

       3. Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium, Strict Dominance, and Efficiency (Intermediate)

       4. Strictly Competitive Games, Security Strategies, and Maxmin Strategies (Intermediate)

       5. Calculating Pure and Mixed Nash Equilibrium in a Three-Player Game (Intermediate)

       6. Calculating Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium of a 3 x 3 Game: An Example (Advanced)

 


TOPIC 6: CONTRACTS (GAME THEORY PLAYLIST 5) (Beginner)


       1. Contracts (Beginner)

 


TOPIC 7: EXTENSIVE FORM (SEQUENTIAL MOVE) GAMES WITH PERFECT INFORMATION (GAME THEORY PLAYLIST 6)  (Beginner-Intermediate)


       1. The Basics of Extensive Form Games (Beginner)

       2. Extensive Form Games: The case of Ultimatum Offer Bargaining Game (Beginner-Intermediate)

       3. Nash Equilibrium in Extensive Games: The Case of Entry-Deterrence Game (Beginner)

       4. Sequential Rationality and Backward Induction (Beginner)

       5. Backward Induction, Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium & Nash Equilibrium (Beginner)

       6. Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium & Nash Equilibrium: Further Details (Beginner)

       7. A Review Example for Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (Beginner)

       8. A Review Example for Nash equilibrium of an Extensive Form Game (Beginner)

       9. A Review Example: Nash versus Subgame Perfect Nash (Beginner)

       10. Extensive Games with infinitely Many Strategies: Stackelberg Duopoly (Intermediate)

       11. A Review Example for an Extensive Game With Infinitely Many Strategies (Intermediate)

       12. A Quick Review: What is Strategy in Extensive Games with Perfect Information? (Beginner)

      

​​

TOPIC 8: EXTENSIVE FORM (SEQUENTIAL MOVE) GAMES WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION (GAME THEORY PLAYLIST 7)  (Beginner-Intermediate-Advanced)​


      1. Subgame Perfection for Extensive Form Games With Imperfect Information (Beginner)

      2. Subgame Perfection for Extensive Form Games With Imperfect Information (Beginner)

      3. One Deviation Property: A Generalization of Backward Induction (Beginner-Intermediate)

      4. An Application: Advertising and Competition (Intermediate)

      5. An Application: Cournot Competition Under Capacity Constraints (Intermediate)

      6. An Application: Dynamic Monopoly and Price Discrimination (Intermediate-Advanced)

      7. A Review Example: SPNE in Finite Games with Imperfect Information (Beginner)

      8. A Review Example: Sequential Location Game (Beginner)

      9. An Example: Strategies, Nash and Subgame Perfect Nash in Extensive Games (Beginner)

      ​

 

TOPIC 9: INTRODUCTION TO REPEATED GAMES (GAME THEORY PLAYLIST 8) (Beginner-Intermediate)​


      1. Finitely Repeated Games: Introduction (Beginner): 

      2. Finitely Repeated Games: History, stage game Nash equilibrium, and SPNE (Beginner)

      3. What is Discount Factor in Repeated Games? (Beginner-Intermediate)

      4. Infinitely Repeated Games and Grim Trigger Strategies (Beginner-Intermediate)

      5. Infinitely Repeated Games and Folk Theorem (Beginner-Intermediate)

      6. Tit for Tat Strategies and Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma (Intermediate)

      7. An Overview of Repeated Games (Intermediate)

 

TOPIC 10: BAYESIAN NASH EQUILIBRIUM (GAME THEORY PLAYLIST 9)  (Beginner-Intermediate-Advanced)​


      1. Introduction to Bayesian Games (Beginner-Intermediate)

      2. Bayesian Games and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) (Beginner-Advanced)

      3. An Example for Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (Intermediate)

      4. An Example for Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (Intermediate)

      5. An Example for Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (Intermediate-Advanced)

      6. An Example for Bayesian Nash Equilibrium: Public Good Provision (Advanced)

      7. An Example for Bayesian Nash Equilibrium: Lemons Problem (Advanced)

      8. An Example for Bayesian Nash Equilibrium: First Price Auction (Advanced)

      9. How to Solve Symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in Auctions - General Approach (Advanced)

      ​

 

TOPIC 11: PERFECT BAYESIAN (NASH) EQUILIBRIUM  (GAME THEORY PLAYLIST 10)  (Advanced)​


      1. Extensive form games with Incomplete Information: Introductory Example (Advanced)

      2. Strategies in Extensive Form Games with Incomplete Information (Advanced)

      3. Strategic Form Representation of Sequential Games with Incomplete Information (Advanced)

      4. Subgame Perfection in Extensive Form Games with Incomplete Information (Advanced)

      5. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: Requirement 1 (Advanced)

      6. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: Requirement 2 (Sequential Rationality) (Advanced)

      7. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: On and Off the Equilibrium Path (Advanced)

      8. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: Requirement 3 (Bayesian Consistency) (Advanced)

      9. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: Requirement 4 (Bayesian Consistency 2) (Advanced)

      10. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: Bayesian Consistency in Tricky Scenarios (Advanced)

      11. How to Solve for Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: Example 1 (Advanced)

      12. How to Solve for Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: Example 2 (Advanced)

      13. How to Solve for Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: Example 3 (Advanced)

      14. How to Solve for Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: Signaling Games (Advanced)

      15. Solving Separating Equilibrium of Signalling Games (Advanced)

      16. Solving Pooling Equilibrium of a Signalling Game (Advanced)

      17. A Quick Review for Pooling and Separating Equilibrium of Signalling Games (Advanced)

      18. Spence's Job Market Signaling Game: Solving for Separating Equilibrium (Advanced)

      19. Spence's Job Market Signaling Game: Solving for Pooling Equilibrium (Advanced)

      20. Solving All Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of a Complete and Imperfect Information Game (Advanced)

 


TOPIC 12: PRINCIPAL – AGENT MODELS (GAME THEORY PLAYLIST 11)  (Beginner-Advanced)​


      1. An Introduction to Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection Problems - Part 1 (Beginner)

      2. An Introduction to Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection Problems - Part 2 (Beginner)

      3. Hidden Information: Fundamentals of Principal-Agent Models (Advanced)

      4. Hidden Information (Screening Problem): Part 1 - First Best Solution (Advanced)

      5. Hidden Information (Screening Problem): Part 2 - Second Best Solution (Advanced)

      6. Hidden Information (Screening Problem): Part 3 - Second Best Solution (Advanced)

      7. Hidden Information (Screening Problem): Part 4 - Second Best Solution (Advanced)

      8. Hidden Information (Screening Problem): Part 5 - Second Best Solution (Advanced)